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The Mind, the Brain, and the Law 
Abstract 
In this chapter, we explore the potential influence that advances in neuroscience may have on legal 
decision makers and present the findings from some recent studies that probe folk intuitions concerning 
the relationships among neuroscience, agency, responsibility, and mental illness. We first familiarize the 
reader with some of the early research in experimental philosophy on people's intuitions about agency 
and responsibility. Then, we focus on a more specific issue—namely, whether people respond to 
explanations of human behavior framed in neuroscientific terms differently than they respond to 
explanations framed in more traditional folk psychological terms. Next, we discuss some new findings 
which suggest that explanations of criminal behavior that are couched in neural terms appear to make 
people less punitive than explanations couched in mental terms, especially in the context of mental 
illness. Finally, we offer what we take to be the best explanation of these differences in people's 
intuitions—namely, when people are presented with neural explanations of human behavior, they tend to 
think that the agent's “deep self” (the values and beliefs the agent identifies with) is somehow left out of 
the causal loop or bypassed, which in turn mitigates the agent's responsibility. 
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